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AFRICAN AMERICANS AND ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
IN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES
David E. Wilkinst
INTRODUCTION
In August of 2003, Harvard University hosted a major conference,
organized by the Civil Rights Project, titled Segregation and Integration
in America's Present and Future. The conference was appropriately sub-
tided the Color Lines Conference, in reference to W.E.B. Du Bois's classic
1903 study The Souls of Black Folk.' This sprawling conference brought
together some of the more significant actors in the Civil Rights
arena-including Gary Orfield, Julian Bond, Antonia Hernandez,
Glenn Loury, William Julius Wilson, and Gerald Torres-to reflect on
the dynamics of residential segregation, racial identity, institutional
barriers to racial integration, inequalities in higher education, and, of
course, lessons learned and not learned from the powerful ruling in
Brown v. Board of Education.2
While the attendees at the conference generally comprised a ra-
cially and ethnically diverse group, a mere handful were of Native
American origin. Moreover, of the fifty-one panels presented, only
one focused upon indigenous issues.3 The few Native-American at-
tendees were disappointed by the paucity of attention paid to indige-
nous issues and rights, particularly because native communities have
endured and continue to endure profound civil, social, religious, le-
gal, and economic problems at the individual, tribal, and national
levels. This lack of indigenous representation and depth of coverage
of issues affecting tribal peoples could, understandably, be attributed
to two broad factors. First, Native Americans are a relatively small but
incredibly diverse population comprised of approximately 2.4 million
self-identified native people that are divided into 562 separate feder-
ally-recognized political entities. 4 Second, and of even greater import,
t David E. Wilkins (Lumbee), is Professor of American Indian Studies at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota. He holds Adjunct appointments in Political Science, Law, and American
Studies.
I W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1996).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 Three of the members of this single panel dealing with indigenous civil rights con-
cerns comprised the majority of Native-American attendees.
4 DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
34 (2002) (citing early data from the 2000 U.S. census). In addition, over 100 groups arc
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is that these diverse small nations occupy a distinctive political, cul-
tural, legal, and territorial position within the United States, 5 which is
disparate enough from that of other minority groups to make exten-
sive coverage at such a conference unlikely.
This second factor, the unique status of indigenous peoples as
separate political bodies, with sui generis cultural, legal, and proprie-
tary rights as the original nations in the Americas, differentiates First
Nations from other ethnic minorities. The hundreds of diplomatic
accords negotiated between tribal nations and European states, the
United States, and several of the thirteen original colonies confirm
this separate status. 6 The Framers of the Constitution further ce-
mented the unique position of tribal nations, delegating to Congress
the power to control commercial relations with tribes7-a power
deemed essential for U.S. financial and political stability during those
critical years of American history.
Before addressing the profound differences between indigenous
people and other resident racial or ethnic groups, this Article exam-
ines some parallels between African-American and indigenous life ex-
periences under the American political and legal systems. The article
will then shift its focus to the more significant differences between the
African-American experience and that of First Nations.
I
AN ASSESSMENT OF SIMILARITIES
The most fundamental similarity between the African-American
and Native-American experiences was the lack of humanity that the
white establishment presumed each group to possess.8 Church offi-
cials, lawmakers, and legal minds intensely debated the relative hu-
manity of each group. The fundamental philosophical and religious
question was whether African Americans and Indians were human be-
ings, entitled to human rights protections like Euro-Americans, or in-
actively pursuing federal recognition, over fifty tribes have state recognition, and several
groups have been terminated by congressional enactment. See id. at 20-23.
5 See generally id. at 41-62 (discussing tribes' unique status as sovereign nations, as
opposed to minority groups, and the features that accompany this status).
6 See generally VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE, 2 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
INDIAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVEN-nONS, 1775-1979, at 745-49,
1018-19, 1084-86 (1999) (containing a brilliant cross-section of the diplomatic accords
negotiated and providing a detailed narrative accompanying these important documents).
7 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that the Congress shall have the power "To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and the Indian
Tribes").
8 This lack of humanity is easily identifiable in the African-American experience, as
their ancestors were first imported as slaves.
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ferior beings, undeserving of comparable rights because of their
alleged animal-like nature.9
For several centuries, whites used the perceived religious defi-
ciencies of African Americans, principally their alleged heathenism, to
justify enslavement and inferior treatment. 10 Numerous examples evi-
dence the prevailing ethos of inferiority that Europeans or Euro-
Americans held towards indigenous peoples from the fifteenth cen-
tury, the time of Christopher Columbus, through the late nineteenth
century. Robert A. Williams, Jr., in his study The American Indian in
Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest, shows that the legal
doctrines of discovery and conquest have been used to deny the basic
human rights of Native peoples in the United States from historical
times to the present:
Violent suppression of Indian religious practices and traditional
forms of government, separation of Indian children from their
homes, wholesale spoliation of treaty-guaranteed resources, forced
assimilative programs, and involuntary sterilization of Indian wo-
men represent but a few of the practical extensions of a racist dis-
course of conquest that at its core regards tribal peoples as
normatively deficient and culturally, politically, and morally
inferior."1
Likewise, while the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution accorded African Americans a measure of
legal recognition of their humanity and constitutional personhood, l2
it was not until a federal court decision in 1879 that the law began to
constitutionally recognize Indians as "persons."'13
A second similarity between the African-American and indige-
nous experiences is the paradoxical treatment that each group has
received from federal authorities. African Americans faced the inher-
ent contradiction embedded in the U.S. Constitution, which banned
the slave trade after 1808,14 yet respected the legality of slavery until
9 Whites considered African Americans to be "draft" animals because they labored
and Indians to be "wild" animals because they occupied large areas of land. See VINE DELO-
RIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 8 (1988).
10 See WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 91-96 (1968).
11 ROBERT A. WItIsAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 325-26 (1990) (citations omitted).
12 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
13 See United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook 25 F. Cas. 695, 700 (C.C.D. Neb.
1879) (No. 14,891) (declaring that "an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws
of the United States, and, has, therefore the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a
federal court").
14 While Article I, § 9 of the Constitution forbade Congress from limiting the slave
trade before 1808, Congress passed legislation in 1807 that banned such trade, and Presi-
dent Jefferson signed the act into law that same year to take effect in 1808. See ROBERT A.
DrVINE ET AL., AMERICA: PAST AND PRESENT 226 (1984).
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the Civil War and the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in
1865.15 Similarly, tribal nations have been deemed independent na-
tions due to their treaty-based relationship with the United States and
preexisting status as de facto and dejure sovereign polities, 16 yet Con-
gress (sanctioned by the federal courts) has asserted a virtually abso-
lute power over tribal nations, their lands, and resources since United
States v. Kagama.1 7
These first two similarities confirm that the original status of Afri-
cans, African Americans, and First Nations under U.S. law was an ex-
traconstitutional consideration. Whites considered African
Americans, as slaves, to be legally inferior beings and thus denied
them basic constitutional rights and privileges.18 Likewise, the United
States viewed the politically "foreign" tribal nations as extra-constitu-
tional entities, even though they were domestically situated, because
they were not parties to the Constitution's construction. 19 Therefore,
this document was largely inapplicable to tribal nations and their af-
fairs inside Indian land.
John Noonan raises a discussion that forms the basis for a third
similarity between the African-American and indigenous experiences:
the place of "persons" in the law.20 Noonan's thesis is that the Ameri-
can legal tradition has often given "masks" to participants in its pro-
cess, concealing those persons' true character. 2 1 These masks are
"legal construct[s]" that function to "suppress[ ] the humanity of a
participant in the process. ' ' 22 Noonan focuses largely on African
Americans and the institution of slavery: American law shielded-or
"masked"-African Americans' humanity behind various descriptions
normally reserved for real, personal, or other types of property.23
15 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
16 See, e.g., Gloria Velencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations
from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting ofJudicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA.J. CONST. L.
405, 422 (2003).
17 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886)
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once
powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their pro-
tection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must
exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, be-
cause the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the
United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can
enforce its laws on all the tribes.
(emphasis added)).
18 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405-08 (1856).
19 See WILKINS, supra note 4, at 44-46.
20 SeeJOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw: CARDozo, HOLMES, JEF-
FERSON, AND WAYrHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 3-28 (1976).
21 Id. at 18-19.
22 Id. at 20.
23 See, e.g., id. at 39 ("From the beginning of the colony, 'slave' and 'Negro' were
terms of art indicating a special legal status.").
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Once "the law" had labeled African Americans as "property," they
could then be bartered, sold, or even killed without the legal system
having to confront the reality that African Americans were human be-
ings entitled to human rights and civil liberties.2 4
Federal law and policy concerning Native Americans also uses
"masks," which deny the basic humanity of Native peoples. Unlike the
"masks" the legal system cast upon African Americans, many of the
masks cast upon Native populations continue to haunt indigenous
people. The Supreme Court has, at various times, characterized tribal
nations as "dependent" peoples and as "wards of the nation."25 The
Court has also described tribal nations as discovered and conquered
peoples, connoting that their proprietary and sovereign rights were
explicitly and categorically reduced vis-d.-vis the discovering conquer-
ors. 26 Another "mask" suggests that the United States has plenary au-
thority over tribes and their resources, thus justifying Congressional
allotment of tribal lands-without first securing tribal consent-in di-
rect violation of treaty provisions.27 A contemporary legal "mask" fac-
ing Native Americans is the notion that tribal nations, having been
geographically incorporated into the body politic of the United States,
have thereby implicitly lost certain inherent powers of sovereignty, in-
cluding the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
who commit crimes within their borders.28
A fourth parallel in the experiences of African Americans and
Native Americans centers on sporadic and intermittent efforts to force
assimilation of African Americans and Native Americans into the body
politic. 29 The sporadic and intermittent nature of such efforts is evi-
denced by the fact that the overall goal of American society until
Brown was generally to deny African Americans entrance to the social
contract.30 Similarly, indigenous peoples at times faced concentrated,
24 See id. at 29-64.
25 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886); see also Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2, 17 (1831) (analogizing the relationship between Native
Americans and the United States to "that of a ward to his guardian" because "[t]hey look to
our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief
to their wants; and address the president as their great father").
26 SeeJohnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823) (denying a tribe the
right to hold legal title to occupied land because "[c]onquest gives a title which the Courts
of the conqueror cannot deny"); see also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272,
279-81 (1955) (holding that a Native American group was not entitled to compensation
under the Takings Clause for taking of timber from occupied land).
27 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567-68 (1903).
28 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) ("Indian tribes
do not have inhecent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians.").
29 See WILKINS, supra note 4, at 192-93.
30 See, e.g., Joyotpaul Chaudhuri, American Indian Policy: An Overview, in AMERICAN IN-
DIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 30-31 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 1985) (discussing the
conflict between the methodological individualism of the Bill of Rights and various tribes'
differing philosophy of the self).
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coercive, and unrelenting pressure to assimilate into American soci-
ety, albeit on an inferior level. Despite wide variation in this impor-
tant sphere, certain thrusts have sought to assimilate the members of
both groups:
Since our Government was organized two questions, or rather two
classes of questions, have transcended all others in importance and
difficulty, viz, the relations of the Government and the white people
to the negroes and to the Indians. The negro question has doubt-
less absorbed more of public attention, aroused more intense feel-
ing, and cost our people more blood and treasure than any other
question, if not all others combined. That question, it is to be
hoped, is settled forever in the only way in which its settlement was
possible-by the full admission of the negro to all the rights and
privileges of citizenship. Next in importance comes the Indian
question, and there can be no doubt that our Indian wars have cost
us more than all the foreign wars in which our Government has
been engaged. It is time that some solution of this whole Indian
problem, decisive, satisfactory, just, and final, should be found. In
my judgment, it can be reached only by a process similar to that
pursued with the negroes.31
Additionally, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the federal government conducted for a brief period an industrial
boarding school to provide education for the children of freed slaves,
a social experiment that aimed simultaneously to "enlighten" and "el-
evate" the status of black and Indian children.32 The school's
founder, Samuel Chapman Armstrong, believed that Indian and Afri-
can American children "must be understood as races that occupied
various rungs on a Social Darwinist 'scale of civilization." 33
Despite the profound political and legal differences discussed be-
low, another similarity in the historical experience of Native Ameri-
cans and African Americans centers on the denial of voting rights.
The two groups have faced, inter alia, a bevy of ideological, institu-
tional, financial, and legal constraints that have either denied or di-
luted their voting power.34 While the Fifteenth Amendment, in
31 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, H. EXEC. Doc. No. 44-1, at 388
(1876).
32 Laura L. Lovett, "African and Cherokee by Choice".- Race and Resistance Under Legalized
Segregation, in CONFOUNDING THE COLOR LINE: THE INDIAN-BLACK EXPERIENCE IN NORTH
AMERICA 204 (James F. Brooks ed., 2002).
-- Id. at 203.
34 See DONALD C. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 78-113 (1991) (discussing constraints on the ability
of African Americans to exercise their voting power); WILKINS, supra note 4, at 191 (discuss-
ing constraints on the ability of Native Americans to exercise their voting rights).
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theory, granted African Americans the right to vote,15 many African
Americans were nonetheless denied voting privileges until the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.36 Likewise, the Indian Naturalization Act seem-
ingly conferred the right to vote upon Native Americans,37 yet several
states, including Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, continued to deny
the franchise to Native Americans living in those states until as late as
the 1960s.38 Both African Americans and Native Americans have en-
dured poll taxes, literacy tests, and gerrymandering, while African
Americans have also had to overcome unabashed violence. 39 Further-
more, Native Americans have confronted constitutional arguments
contesting their suffrage, including arguments citing Native Ameri-
cans' exemption from certain state taxes, 40 as well as sovereignty argu-
ments, claiming that Native Americans' status as members of alien
nations precludes them from voting.41
A sixth parallel between the treatment of the two groups can be
seen in the timing of their social integration. In 1954, the same year
the Court decided Brown, Congress passed the first termination law, a
measure aimed at incorporating and integrating Native Americans
into American society by abruptly ending the federal government's
trust relationship to the Menominee tribe of Wisconsin.42 Ironically,
the termination policy was euphemistically labeled the Indians'
"Emancipation Proclamation," because it theoretically would "free"
tribal nations and their encumbered citizens from the oppressive bu-
reaucracy of federal paternalism . 4 3
One final parallel will suffice. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s,
the federal government extended a measure of equal rights and op-
portunities to African Americans by prohibiting employment discrimi-
35 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XV ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.").
36 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (2000)).
47 Indian Citizenship Act ofJune 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000)).
38 See Daniel McCool, Indian Voting, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY, supra note 30, at 108-16.
39 See WILKINs, supra note 4, at 193-94. For example, several redistricting attempts in
parts of Montana and South Dakota, both historically and presently, have sought to dilute
the Native American vote. Id. at 194.
40 See id. at 194-95 (citing Glenn A. Phelps, Mr. Gerry Goes to Arizona: Electoral Geography
and Voting Rights in Navajo County, 15 AM. INDIAN CULTURE REs. J. 63 (1991)).
41 McCool, supra note 38, at 106-07; see Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884).
42 Menomine Indians Act of June 17, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-399, 68 Stat. 250 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902), repealed by Menomine Restoration Act of December 22, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-197, § 3(b), 87 Stat. 770; see DONALD L. Fixico, TERMINATION AND RELOCA-
TION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1945-1960, at 94-104 (1986).
43 See Fixico, supra note 42, at 95.
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nation,44 protecting voting rights, 45 encouraging affirmative action, 46
and striking down state antimiscegenation laws. 47 Despite these im-
portant changes, many African Americans still face discrimination and
resegregation in housing and employment, poverty, and unfair treat-
ment by the criminal justice system (such as racial profiling), all of
which combine to fundamentally limit their rights to life, liberty, and
justice.4 3
Similarly, Native Americans have faced coerced assimilation into
the American mainstream, through which they have been forced to
sacrifice additional lands, natural resources, and treaty and civil rights.
The citizenship that they have received in return has amounted to a
second-class citizenship in many parts of the country due to persistent
discrimination and ongoing legal constraints, including congressional
and judicial attacks on their rights. 49 As the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights noted in a detailed report issued in 2003:
A quiet crisis is occurring in Indian Country. Whether intentional
or not, the government is failing to live up to its trust responsibility
to Native peoples. The federal government undertook a legal and
moral obligation to make up for what had been taken from Native
Americans and to ensure their well-being. This obligation is rooted
in the history of displacement of entire tribes and the confiscation
of natural resources that they depended upon for their livelihood.
Perennial government failure to compensate Native Americans and
the residual effects of the nation's long history of mistreatment of
Native peoples have increased the need for federal assistance even
further. Efforts to bring Native Americans up to the standards of
44 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000)) (prohibiting discrimination in public accommoda-
tions, including employment).
45 See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amcnded at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (2000)) (empowering the federal government to take
a broad range of action to adequately ensure that no citizen is denied the right to vote on
account of race); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that
Virginia's poll tax violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
46 See, e.g., Exec Order No. 11,375, 35 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (Oct. 13, 1967) (requiring that
federal contractors take affirmative action towards hiring minorities).
47 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1965) (holding Virginia's ban on interracial
marriage unconstitutional).
48 See Norman Redlich, "Out Damned Spot; Out I Say:" The Persistence of Race in American
Law, 25 VT. L. REv. 475, 516-21 (2001). See generally A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY (Gerald DavidJaynes & Robin M. Williams,Jr. eds., 1989) (analyzing the
continued challenges African Amcricans face in the United States).
49 See generally Fa.DERycK E. HoxiE, A FINAL PROMIsE: THE CxMPAIGN TO ASSIMIlATE
THE INDIANS, 1880-1920 (1984) (surveying efforts to assimilate Native Americans and the
resulting economic and social suffering); PE-I'RA T. SHATrUCK & JILL NORGREN, PARTAL
JUSTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM (1991) (describing
courts' legal treatment of Native Americans as inherently contradictory because the federal
government's plenary power over Native Americans counteracts principles of equal
treatment).
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other Americans have failed in part because of a lack of sustained
funding. The failure manifests itself in massive and escalating un-
met needs in areas documented in this report and numerous
others. The disparities in services show evidence of discrimination
and denial of equal protection of the laws.5 0
Although the legal system has supposedly integrated Native Americans
into the broader characterization of Americans, Native Americans
nonetheless remain a marginalized community.
II
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATIVE-AMERICAN AND
AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCES
The similarities presented above provide potent parallels in the
historical experiences of African Americans and Native Americans,
but history, law, politics, and culture suggest even greater substantive
differences between these two groups. The first and most obvious dif-
ference is that Native Americans are the indigenous inhabitants of the
United States. Of what significance is this obvious observation? The
preexistence and the nationhood that tribal nations, qua nations, pos-
sessed underlies the distinctive sovereign-to-sovereign relationships
that Native Americans still share with state and federal governments. 5'
Unlike African individuals who involuntarily arrived as slaves, Native
Americans were present in America, inhabiting bounded homelands
with economic, cultural, and governing infrastructures, for millennia.
Thus, Native Americans continue to perceive themselves not only as
pre-constitutional polities, but as continuing extraconstitutional na-
tions who deal with state and federal governments on a government-
to-government basis.
Second, the distinct sovereign status of tribal nations necessitated
the practice of negotiating treaties, political compacts, accords, and
alliances, first with one another, then with the various competing Eu-
ropean states, and later with the United States.52 This diplomatic pro-
cess (in which no other resident racial or ethnic group participated) 53
and the resulting treaties, agreements, and negotiated settlements
confirmed a fundamental and diplomatic political relationship be-
50 U.S. COMM'N ON Crv. RaGHTS: A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET NEEDS
IN INDIAN COUNTRY 110 (2003).
51 See generally WILKINS, supra note 4 (analyzing the internal dynamics of Native Ameri-
can governments and their politics, and examining relationship of Native Americans to the
states and the federal government).
52 See, e.g., DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra note 6 (compiling Native American treaties,
agreements, and conventions from 1775-1979).
53 Hawaiian natives are included in the grouping "indigenous people" because they
signed accords with both foreign powers and the United States. See WILKINS, supra note 4,
at 11-12.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tween Native Americans and the federal government, even if the dip-
lomatic partners were not always of equal power. 54 Approximately 370
of these important contractual arrangements form the baseline pa-
rameters of the political relationship between Native-American tribes
and the United States. 55 While these agreements remain legally valid,
their enforcement by the federal courts and Congress has been prob-
lematic since the Indian Removal era of the 1830s. Many of these
treaties involved substantial land cessions by tribal nations, containing
articles that created the present-day set of Indian reservations.5 6
Because tribal nations are treaty-recognized sovereigns, indige-
nous rights are not based on, or generally subject to, U.S. Constitu-
tional law. 57 As preexisting sovereigns, the Constitution does not
protect tribal nations either because First Nations do not derive
their inherent governmental powers from the federal or state
governments. 58
A third feature differentiating Native Americans from African
Americans and other groups is the relevance and meaning of the trust
doctrine. 59 While the federal government and tribal nations have
rarely agreed upon the exact contours of the trust principle, President
Clinton provided a fairly clear description of the federal perspective
of this doctrine in a 1998 executive order: "The United States has a
unique legal relationship with Indian tribal governments as set forth
in the Constitution of the United States, treaties, statutes, Executive
orders, and court decisions. Since the formation of the Union, the
United States has recognized Indian tribes as domestic dependent na-
tions under its protection."60 The President sought to assure Native-
American nations that the federal government recognized their sover-
eign governmental status, which the federal government, as a separate
though connected sovereign, is legally and morally bound to re-
spect.61 The hundreds of treaties and agreements guaranteeing Na-
tive-American tribes all the rights and resources not specifically ceded
54 See id. at 245-52.
55 See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL
ANOMALY app. B (1994) (containing a detailed list of the ratified U.S.-Indian treaties).
56 EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY TO THE SEC-
RETARY OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION 1896--97, INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, Part 2 (Charles C. Royce, comp. 1899) (compiling Native American land cessions
from 1784-1894); see PRUCHA, supra note 55, at 103-04 (describing the "massive" land
transfers from Native Americans to the federal government through treaty cessions).
57 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
58 Cf id. at 384-85 (denying application of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause
to the Cherokee Nation's grand jury proceedings).
59 See generally DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TsANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERI-
CAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNT AND FEDERAL LAw 64-97 (2001) (describing the nature and vari-
ous conceptions of the trust doctrine).
6o Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998).
61 Se id.
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away were contractual rights that the trust doctrine also protected.
This doctrine constitutes the United States's legal and moral pledge to
respect those reserved rights.
6 2
More important, however, was the President's use of the phrase
"under its [the United States's] protection."63 This was a declaration
that the United States has a protectorate obligation to support Native
Americans legally, culturally, economically, and politically. The
phrase "trustee-beneficiary relationship" best describes this obliga-
tion-not "guardian-ward relationship," which for many years was the
stereotypical view of the relationship between Native Americans and
the United States. 64 As Vine Deloria notes:
[T]he "trust responsibility" of the federal government toward In-
dian tribes is mandated by the fact that Indians are extraconstitu-
tional. No constitutional protections exist for Indians in either a
tribal or an individual sense, and hence the need for special rules
and regulations, special administrative discretionary authority, and
special exemptions. This special body of law replaces the constitu-
tional protections granted to other members of American society.
65
A fourth concept, congressional plenary power, emphatically and
profoundly distinguishes tribal nations from African Americans-
probably more so than any other concept discussed in this Article. 66
In its broadest common-sense use, "plenary" means entire, unquali-
fied, and absolute. 67
The term, however, has developed several specific meanings with
regard to federal Indian policy.68 First, plenary means exclusive69 the
Commerce Clause vests in Congress the sole authority to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes. '70 The Framers believed that the power to
engage in diplomacy and trade with tribal nations should rest with the
legislative branch, not with the states, which had retained the right to
deal with tribes in their proximity under the Articles of Confedera-
tion.7 1 Second, and related to the first definition, plenary also means
62 See WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 59, at 67.
63 Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998).
64 See Felix S. Cohen, Indian Wardship: The Twilight of a Myth, in THE LEGAL CON-
SCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 328-34 (1960) (distinguishing the terms
"trusteeship" and "guardianship" based on the powers that are concomitant with the
latter).
65 Vine Deloria,Jr., The Distinctive Status of Indian Rights, in THE PLAINS INDIANS OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 237, 241 (Peter Iverson ed., 1985).
66 See WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 59, at 99 (describing the contradictory nature
of plenary power doctrine's relationship to tribal sovereignty).
67 THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1486 (2d ed. 1987).
68 See WILKINS & LomAWAimA, supra note 59, at 99.
69 Id.
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
71 See WILKINS & LoMAWAIMA, supra note 59, at 198-99.
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preemptive.72 That is, Congress may enact legislation effectively pre-
cluding state governments from acting in Indian-related matters.73 Fi-
nally, and most controversially (because this meaning lacks an explicit
or implicit constitutional basis), plenary has come to mean unlimited or
virtually absolute power.74 This judicially constructed definition, first an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama, means that
Congress has virtually boundless governmental authority and jurisdic-
tion over tribal nations, their lands, and resources.75
In some important respects, the legal landscape that African
Americans faced prior to the Brown decision embodied characteristics
of plenary power. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments, however, provided some slight measure of protection for Afri-
can Americans, whereas no such constitutional amendments have ever
protected the rights of Native Americans. 7 6 Furthermore, despite the
treaties-or perhaps because of the treaties-the federal government
may invoke its self-proclaimed plenary power to quash, dramatically
diminish, or reaffirm Native-American rights. 7 7 In 2004, for instance,
the Supreme Court noted that "the Constitution grants Congress
broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers
that we have consistently described as 'plenary and exclusive."' 78 Fed-
eral plenary power, when defined as unlimited and virtually absolute,
is arguably constitutionally problematic, given that the United States is
a democratic state that purports to adhere to the notion that absolute
power cannot logically exist in a nation that follows the rule of law.
Although the fact that Native Americans have had status as U.S. citi-
zens since 192479 should also work to prohibit the exercise of federal
plenary power over Indians, it has not.80
72 Itd. at 104-06.
73 Id. at 104.
74 Id. at 106-14.
75 118 U.S. 375, 379-85 (1886).
75 See VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, AND CONSTITUITIONAL
TRIBULATIONS 140-50 (1999) (describing the inapplicability of these Amendments to the
Native American population).
77 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 1628, 1634 (2004) ("Congress,
with this Court's approval, has interpreted the Constitution's 'plenary' grants of power as
authorizing it to enact legislation that both restricts and, in turn, relaxes those restrictions
on tribal sovereign authority."); see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903)
(noting that Congress has the power to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty when
justifying circumstances arise).
78 Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1633.
79 See Indian Citizenship Act ofJune 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000)).
80 See Deloria, supra note 65, at 243 ("'[C]itizenship is not incompatible with tribal
existence or continued guardianship, and so may be conferred without completely emanci-
pating the Indians or placing them beyond the reach of congressional regulations adopted
for their protection.'" (quoting United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916))).
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Congress and the Supreme Court justify this treatment of Native
Americans because tribal nations constitute separate political bodies,
as exemplified by the treaty relationship, the trust doctrine, and the
Commerce Clause."' This status as separate sovereigns permits tribal
courts to prosecute nonmember Indians for crimes committed on In-
dian lands while federal courts may also prosecute the same individual
for the same offense: the Double Jeopardy Clause is inapplicable as a
defense because the accused is being tried by distinct political
entities.82
Ironically, tribes' extraconstitutional and sovereign status also
provides the federal government with the pretext to claim a virtually
absolute power over First Nations because the Constitution is still gen-
erally inapplicable inside Indian lands.8 3 Although individual Native
Americans are now citizens of both the United States and their resi-
dent states, the Bill of Rights and other constitutional amendments
only partially protect tribal members from both the federal and their
tribal governments. s 4 For instance, while the Fifteenth Amendment
guarantees all persons, including Indians, the right to vote (provided
that they meet the necessary qualifications), 85 the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's due process and equal protection rights8 6 are not guaranteed
to Indians within Indian territory.87 In 1971, the Tenth Circuit recog-
nized this lack of protection in Groundhog v. Keeler,88 noting that the
Indian Bill of Rights of 196889 embraces neither of these components
of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 0 Furthermore, and perhaps even
more importantly, the Tenth Circuit noted that there is no limitation
81 See Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1633 (recognizing that the Indian Commerce Clause and the
Treaty Clause grant Congress the power to regulate the status of tribes who would other-
wise maintain their own inherent tribal power as tribal sovereigns).
82 Id. at 1639.
83 SeeDELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 76, at 97 (1999) ("[F]ederal constitutional rights
exist only when Indians are living off the reservation as American citizens ..
84 See id. at 138.
85 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XV.
86 Id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person ... the equal protection of
the laws.").
87 See id. at 148 ("[T]he Indian Citizenship Act qualifies Indians to exercise rights
under the Fifteenth Amendment but does not provide them with the due-process and
equal-protection rights of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
88 44 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971).
89 Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title II, § 201, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-02 (2000)).
90 Id. at 678, 681-82 (noting that "[t]he provisions of the Constitution of the United
States have no application to Indian nations or their governments, except as they are ex-
pressly made so by the Constitution (the Commerce Clause), or ... an Act of Congress,"
and that the legislative history to the Indian Bill of Rights precludes interpreting that provi-
sion to make the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
applicable to tribal nations).
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on the power of Congress to enact legislation with respect to tribal
nations.9 1
III
SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF DISPARATE TREATMENT
The doctrines and concepts discussed above provide a critical
backdrop to examine specific examples where First Nations have been
treated differently than African Americans. The infamous Dred Scott v.
Sandford&2 decision provides a powerful example. In Dred Scott, the
Court denied Congress the power to prohibit slavery and held that
African-American slaves-and even free African Americans-were not
entiled to federal citizenship and thus did not have standing to sue in
federal court.93 In so holding, Chief Justice Taney manipulated the
status of blacks against Indians in a way that reduced African-Ameri-
can rights but, in dicta, affirmed tribal sovereignty:
94
The situation of this [African-American] population was altogether
unlike that of the Indian race. The latter, it is true, formed no part
of the colonial communities, and never amalgamated with them in
social connections or in government. But although they were unciv-
ilized, they were yet a free and independent people, associated to-
gether in nations or tribes, and governed by their own laws. Many
of these political communities were situated in territories to which
the white race claimed the ultimate right of dominion. But that
claim was acknowledged to be subject to the right of the Indians to
occupy it as long as they thought proper, and neither the English
nor colonial Governments claimed or exercised any dominion over
the tribe or nation by whom it was occupied, nor claimed the right
to the possession of the territory, until the tribe or nation consented
to cede it. These Indian Governments were regarded and treated as
foreign Governments, as much so as if an ocean had separated the
red man from the white; and their freedom has constantly been ac-
knowledged, from the time of the first emigration to the English
colonies to the present day, by the different Governments which
succeeded each other. Treaties have been negotiated with them,
and their alliance sought for in war; and the people who compose
these Indian political communities have always been treated as for-
eigners not living under our Government."
This statement, however, should not be interpreted to imply that
Chief Justice Taney was an advocate of Indian self-determination and
tribal sovereignty. As evidenced by his earlier unanimous opinion in
91 Id. at 678 ("[lit is well settled that Congress has exclusive and plenary power to
enact legislation with respect to the Indian tribes.").
92 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
93 Id. at 452-54.
94 See id. at 403-04.
95 Id.
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writing for a unanimous Court in United States v. Rogers,96 ChiefJustice
Taney declared that:
The country [Cherokee lands] in which the crime is charged to
have been committed is a part of the territory of the United States,
and not within the limits of any particular State. It is true that it is
occupied by the tribe of Cherokee Indians. But it has been assigned
to them by the United States, as a place of domicile for the tribe,
and they hold and occupy it with the assent of the United States,
and under their authority. The native tribes who were found on
this continent at the time of its discovery have never been acknowl-
edged or treated as independent nations by the European govern-
ments, nor regarded as the owners of the territories they
respectively occupied. On the contrary, the whole continent was di-
vided and parcelled out, and granted by the governments of Europe
as if it had been vacant and unoccupied land, and the Indians con-
tinually held to be, and treated as, subject to their dominion and
control.97
Which of these contradictory statements provides a more accu-
rate depiction of Native-American status, land title, and tribal-federal
relations? Chief Justice Taney's attitude towards Indian nations is
more clearly evident in his statement in Rogers. The positive character-
ization of tribal status articulated in Dred Scott, while historically accu-
rate, seems to be merely a rhetorical ploy used to diminish the human
and civil rights of African Americans. Furthermore, because it ap-
peared only in dicta, this characterization lacked any force of law.98
A second equally powerful contrast between Native-American and
African-American status arose in 1896. In this year, the Supreme
Court handed down its devastating Plessy v. Ferguson99 ruling, establish-
ing the "separate but equal" doctrine and sanctioning 'Jim Crow
laws." " ' On the same day and by an identical eight-to-one majority
(with Justice Harlan dissenting in both cases), the Court held in Tal-
ton v. Mayes'01 that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to tribes, rea-
soning that their sovereignty existed prior to the Constitution and
therefore depended upon the will of the Cherokee people and not
the will of the American public.' 0 2 Decisions like Talton recognized
and affirmed the ongoing political sovereignty of tribal nations.
A third contrast between Native Americans and African Ameri-
cans arose in 1903, the year in which W.E.B. Du Bois's novel the Souls
96 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
97 Id. at 571-72.
98 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403-04.
99 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
100 See id. at 551-52.
101 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
102 Id. at 376, 384-85.
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of Black Folks1 03 was published and the Supreme Court handed down
one of its most horrific Indian law decisions. In Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock,' 0 4 the Court recognized that the federal government has virtually
absolute plenary power over Indian lands and property, holding unan-
imously that Congress had the power to abrogate Indian treaty provi-
sions designed to protect the communal land holdings of tribes.10 5
The Court implied plenary power through the application of convo-
luted logic and in defiance of the prior treaty case law. 10 6 This aspect
of the decision has not been overruled, and First Nations today must
still cope with the strange result that they, as the original sovereigns of
North America, have somehow been politically and economically sub-
jugated by latter day sovereigns that established themselves in their
midst.10 7 For Du Bois, the "problem of the Twentieth Century [was]
the problem of the color-line." 10 8 For tribal nations, as a result of Lone
Wolf (and other related decisions and congressional policies), the
problem of the fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nine-
teenth, twentieth, and now twenty-first centuries was, and continues to
be, not only a color line, but a problem of cultural, territorial, natural
resource, and political power lines.
CONCLUSION
Native Americans and African Americans, generally speaking,
have historically endured a similar lack of rights, even though the law
has treated each group quite differently. The rights of African Ameri-
cans have been constitutionally entrenched via Amendments, while
those of Native Americans are explicitly or implicitly connected to
constitutional clauses, including the Commerce Clause and Treaty
Clause. Despite significant strides each group has made, the individ-
ual rights of these citizens nevertheless remain subject to vacillating
interpretation, spotty implementation, and unequal enforcement.
103 Du Bois, supra note 1.
104 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
105 Id. at 565-68.
106 See DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 76, at 87-88 (describing the Lone Wolfopinion as
one that "pitt[ed] the treaty-making power against the property clause").
107 See WILKINS & LOMAWAimA, supra note 59, at 113.
108 Du Bois, supra note 1, at 1.
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